R&D outsourcing contract for the unverified value of tacit knowledge sharing by Song, Han et al.
Journal of  Industrial Engineering and Management
JIEM, 2015 – 8(5): 1349-1361 – Online ISSN: 2013-0953 – Print ISSN: 2013-8423
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1497
R&D Outsourcing Contract for the Unverified Value 
of  Tacit Knowledge Sharing
Han Song, YuQing. Liu, Ying Dai, Jing Zhu 
Chongqing University of  Technology (China)
songhan_0@126.com, huangfang@cqut.edu.cn, daiying@cqut.edu.cn, songhan@cqut.edu.cn
Received: May 2015
Accepted: October 2015
Abstract:
Purpose:  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  R&D  outsourcing  contract  design
framework to incent R&D outsourcing service providers sharing tacit knowledge.
Design/methodology/approach: The  author  uses  the  principal-agent  theory  to  builds
multitask principal-agent model which focuses on two cases. One case is that the effort costs of
explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are complementary, while another is the effort costs are
substitutable.
Findings: When the costs  of  explicit  and tacit  knowledge sharing are complementary,  the
buyer can increase the incentive coefficient of  explicit  knowledge sharing to stimulate tacit
knowledge sharing. This motive method not only stimulates tacit knowledge sharing, but also
will further stimulate the effort levels of  explicit knowledge sharing. Moreover, the multitask
R&D outsourcing contract can motivate the effort of  explicit knowledge sharing to achieve
system optimization, but it fails to motivate the effort of  tacit knowledge sharing to achieve
system optimization.
Research  limitations/implications: In  this  paper  we  only  consider  that  the  outsourcing
relationship is short-term, so the multitask R&D outsourcing contract is formal. In fact, the
outsourcing relationship may be long-term, and the multitask R&D outsourcing contract will be
informal. 
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Practical implications: Our study provides a theoretical model for formulating an effective
R&D outsourcing contract and promoting the transfer of  tacit knowledge sharing.
Originality/value: The paper extends prior literature by designing multitask R&D outsourcing
contract in order to share the tacit knowledge. We not only consider the cost of  substitution
relationship between tacit  knowledge and explicit  knowledge,  but also consider the cost  of
complementary relationship.
Keywords: R&D outsourcing,  knowledge  sharing,  tacit  knowledge  value,  principal-agent,  incentive
contract
1. Introduction
For  acquiring external  knowledge quickly,  the enterprises  may outsource R&D business  to
professional service providers (SP) (Han & Bae, 2014). Knowledge can be divided into explicit
knowledge and tacit knowledge (Mulkay, 2014). Most of explicit knowledge in R&D outsourcing
is expressed in the form of reports, patents software and so on. Its value can be verified by
third-party organizations, such as review panel, Patent Office and Software Testing Center. In
contrast, tacit knowledge can be transmitted and shared between SP and enterprises through
communication, but its value cannot be verified like explicit knowledge (Suppiah & Sandhu,
2011). 
Zhou, Qu and Joyce (2012) thought that R&D outsourcing should be discussed within the
context of risk management theory. Based on the British Petroleum (BP) neural network, they
built a risk-warning model which can examine and manage R&D outsourcing risks. Bals, Kneis,
Lemke and Pedersen (2013) emphasized that managers must understand, which R&D activities
can be outsourced and which need to stay in-house in order to ensure competitiveness. R&D
outsourcing  may  result  in  intellectual  property  infringement.  Buss  and  Peukert  (2015)
discussed  how  the  intellectual  property  infringement  caused  by  R&D  outsourcing  fosters
technology diffusion and affects R&D Outsourcing decision.
The outsourcing contract stipulates the rights and obligations of the buyer and contractors (Qi
& Chau, 2012). At present, there are much literature which concern outsourcing contract. For
example, Aksin, De Véricourt and Karaesmen (2008) studied a call center outsourcing contract
analysis and choice problem, which faced by a contractor and a service provider, who receives
an uncertain call volume over multiple periods and is considering outsourcing all or part of
these  calls  to  a  contractor.  Yao,  Jiang,  Young  and  Talluri  (2010)  studied  three  common
outsourcing contracts (fixed-price, cost-plus, and gain-sharing) and address issues, when to
outsource and which contracts to select. Based on analyzing risk factors of producer services
outsourcing,  Cai,  Kai  and  Zou  (2011)  built  the  producer  services  outsourcing  contract  by
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designing the incentive and monitoring mechanism. Zhu, Li and Zheng (2014) built a game
theoretic model, which is used to design the optimal contracts between the buyer and the
supplier under two types of information scenario. Gershman and Kuznetsova (2013) thought
that efficient contracts should guarantee not only fair rewards but also competitive selection in
order to prevent an excessive inflow of the workforce from other sectors of the economy. 
The  existing  outsourcing  contracts  may  focus  on  the  transmission  and  sharing  of  explicit
knowledge whose value can be verified, and ignore the unverified value of tacit knowledge. It
leads to the insufficient sharing of tacit knowledge in R&D outsourcing. However, a lot of tacit
knowledge is  the key for  employers to make technological  breakthrough (Martínez-Noya &
García-Canal, 2011; Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012). Therefore, how to design an effective contract
to share the tacit knowledge whose value is unverified and to acquire explicit knowledge is an
issue  that  must  be  considered when  the  buyer  formulates  the  R&D outsourcing  contracts
(Quinn & Strategy, 2013). 
The  existing  R&D outsourcing  contract  researches  concern  the  choice  of  R&D outsourcing
contracts, the design and optimization of contracts parameters and so on. For example, Jain,
Hasija and Popescu (2013) analysed and compared the effectiveness of fixed-price contracts
and  cost-plus  contracts  in  terms  of  the  choice  of  R&D  outsourcing  contracts  from  many
aspects, such as ex ante information asymmetry and ex post information asymmetry, friction
in renegotiation and project uncertainty. Aiming at parameter selection in R&D outsourcing
contract, Ulset (1996) researched the outsourcing cases of 80 enterprises. It has achieved the
effective mechanism of managing the R&D outsourcing contracts and puts forward the method
to choose the parameters in R&D outsourcing contract. Aiming at researching the behavior that
service providers disclose customers’ knowledge in outsourcing, Lai, Riezman and Wang (2009)
built the multi-period game model and optimizes the excitation parameters of R&D outsourcing
contract.  It  has  helped  control  the  possible  disclosure  of  service  providers.  Suppiah  and
Sandhu (2011)  designed a  structural  questionnaire  and  carried  out  a  field survey on the
willingness of tacit knowledge sharing among 216 knowledge employees. The results showed
that  different  types  of  psychological contracts  have  different  influences  on  employees'
willingness of tacit knowledge sharing. 
All the literature above introduce the consequence of knowledge sharing, namely the value of
knowledge, into contract when choosing R&D outsourcing contracts, designing and optimizing
parameters, thereby linking the income of service providers with the value of knowledge to
stimulate service providers to share knowledge (Pashupatimath & Ramakrishna, 2015). Explicit
knowledge can be verified by the third-party organizations and be regarded as an object of
contracts. Therefore, the knowledge-sharing of service providers above, which is stimulated by
the connection between the income of service providers and the value of knowledge in R&D
outsourcing contract, has some effects in stimulating explicit knowledge-sharing. Nevertheless,
the value of tacit knowledge cannot be verified by the third-party organizations, thus the R&D
-1351-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1497
outsourcing contract seems so feeble in stimulating tacit knowledge sharing (Kultti & Takalo,
2000). There are a lot of researches on inter-organizational tacit knowledge sharing (Cheng,
2011;  Soekijad  &  Andriessen,  2003),  which  research strategic  alliances,  virtual  team and
supply chain separately, but there are few researches about tacit knowledge sharing in R&D
outsourcing contracts. However, they focus on the problem of tacit  knowledge sharing and
ignore the fact that explicit knowledge sharing and tacit knowledge sharing should complement
each other.  For this  problem, Song, Zhang and Li  (2012) built  a  multitask principal-agent
model for explicit knowledge sharing and tacit knowledge sharing. It emphatically analyzes
whether the stimulation of explicit  knowledge sharing will  influence the stimulation of tacit
knowledge sharing or not, and in what manner. But it is regrettable that the author does not
provide further analysis about how to realize the stimulation of explicit and tacit knowledge
sharing when the value of tacit knowledge cannot be verified.
Given this, this paper builds a multitask principal-agent model for explicit and tacit knowledge
sharing stimulation in the case of unverified value of tacit knowledge, and analyzes the effect
of  formal contract and  informal  contract  on  the  incentive  of  explicit  and  tacit  knowledge
sharing in R&D outsourcing contract in short-term as well as in long-term, so as to provide a
theoretical model for formulating an effective R&D outsourcing contract and promoting the
transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing.
2. The Model
Consider a risk neutral buyer outsourcing R&D project to a risk neutral SP. Generally speaking,
service  providers  create  and  innovate  knowledge  technology  by  investing  knowledge,
technology and human capital in R&D, most researches use the degree of service provider’s
hardworking to  describe the R&D’s  investment of service providers  quantitatively.  For that
reason, this paper follows this method, but it divides effort into two types according to the
characteristics of knowledge, which includes explicit and tacit knowledge. One is e1, the level of
efforts made in sharing explicit knowledge, which can be expressed by coding and whose value
can be verified by the third-party organizations; the other is  e2, the level of efforts made in
sharing tacit knowledge, which cannot be expressed by coding and whose value cannot be
verified by the third-party organizations, wherein 0 ≤ e1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ e2 ≤ 1. Suppose further that the
cost  function  of  these  two  efforts  is  ,  wherein  k1 and  k2 are
independent quadratic cost coefficients for the two efforts respectively, s is the cost correlation
coefficient  of  the two efforts.  The cost  function above has the general  features of  convex
function,  which cost  and marginal  cost  increase progressively.  If  s <  0,  it  means that  the
increase of one effort can lead to the decrease of the marginal cost of the other effort. In the
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same way, if  s > 0, it means that the increase of one effort can lead to the increase of the
marginal cost of the other effort. 
Where e1 is the input (efforts level) of service providers in sharing explicit knowledge, e2 is the
efforts level of service providers in sharing tacit knowledge,  k1 and  k2 are independent cost
coefficient for the two efforts respectively, s is the cost correlation coefficient of the two efforts.
The cost function above has the general features of convex function, which cost and marginal
cost increase progressively. On the other hand, the cross partial derivative of two efforts’ cost
function is  . if  s < 0, it means that the increase of one effort can lead to the
decrease of the marginal cost of the other effort. In the same way, if s > 0, it means that the
increase  of  one  effort  can  lead  to  the  increase  of  the  marginal  cost  of  the  other  effort.
Consequently, the cost correlation coefficient of two efforts  s shows the complementary or
substitutional relationship between explicit and tacit knowledge. The value which the buyer can
earn from explicit and tacit knowledge sharing is  π1(e1) =  λ1e1,  π2 =  λ2e2, where  λ1,  λ2 are the
output coefficient. The value π1 can be verified, but the value π2 can be verified. As employers
cannot observe the efforts of service providers, there is a moral hazard. The conventional
method to  solve this  problem is offering incentive wage. This paper uses revenue sharing
contract to stimulate service providers to work hard, and continues to use the linear revenue-
sharing contract. We assumes that the payment paid by buyer is W = F + β1π1 + β2π2, wherein F
is  the  fixed-price  of  R&D outsourcing,  β1 and  β2 are  the  incentive  coefficients  of  revenue
sharing, which are produced by sharing explicit and tacit knowledge. The component β2 is not
enforced  by  the  third  parties  such  as  courts  since  the  outcome  π2 is  unverifiable.  Formal
contract is a kind of promise, which is used for ex ante definition and ex post verification.
Besides, it can be enforced by the third-party organizations (e.g. court). Under the formal R&D
outsourcing contracts, the buyer and service providers are playing a single-cycle game. The
time series of the game is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Time Series of the Game of Formal R&D Outsourcing Contract
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According to the principle of reverse solving in a game, stage 3 should be firstly considered,
that is, the buyer decide whether to fulfill the contracts or not. No matter the project succeeds
or not, this fixed-price must be paid. Then, the achievements of explicit knowledge, as long as
being verified by the third-party organizations, must be paid for by the buyer as stated in the
contracts. If not, the buyer may be prosecuted and court will bring in an enforcement verdict.
Compared with explicit knowledge, the value of tacit knowledge cannot be verified by court, so
even though the buyer do not pay the money according to contracts, there is no risk in law. In
this case, the buyer will choose to implement tacit knowledge sharing stimulation or not. If
they do, d = 1; if they do not, d = 0. Therefore, the expected revenue of the buyer R in the third
stage is R = (1 – β1)λ1e1 + (1 – dβ2)λ2e2 – F. Clearly, the revenue when d = 0 is higher than that
when d = 1. For this reason, in the third stage of the game, the buyer who seeks to maximize
their interests will choose d = 0, which means they will not admit the value of tacit knowledge
sharing. Then the revenue of the buyer can be expressed as
R = (1 – β1)λ1e1 + λ2e2 – F (1)
In the second stage of the game, The SP decide how much efforts they will make to share
explicit and tacit  knowledge. According to the principle of complete rationality and reverse
solving, in this stage, service providers can predict that the buyer will not pay for the value of
tacit knowledge sharing in the third stage, namely they predict d = 0. As a result, the expected
revenue of service providers r is
(2)
In the first stage of the game, the buyer designs the R&D outsourcing contract. The contract
must  satisfy  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  and  the  participation  constraint  of
principal-agent relationship. It can be described by the following optimization model P1 with
inequality constraints:
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
In model P1, formula (3) is the target function of the buyer’s revenue maximization, formula
(4)  and (5) are  incentive  compatibility  constraints  of  service  providers  and formula (6)  is
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participation constraint of service providers, which ensures that when service providers accept
R&D, their revenue is not less than reservation utility U. It should be noted that fixed-price F is
used to adjust the revenue of service providers in participation constraint. When the buyer’s
revenue reaches the maximum, the equation in participation constraint always holds. That is to
say, the model above achieves the optimal condition .
3. Model Solution
When  s > 0, then there must be  . It means, when the two are mutually
substitutable, the optimal effort levels of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are  ,
e2 = 0. The buyer’s revenue is  . The buyer choose  β1 to maximize
revenue, so the first order condition of their maximum revenue R is .
So we can get  into , the optimal effort of sharing explicit knowledge is .
Finally, get   into the formula of fixed-price   and the
optimal fixed-price of R&D outsourcing is . At last, substitute all decision variables
into  the  function  of  the  buyer’s  revenue  (1),  and  the  maximum revenue  of  employer  is
. 
When s > 0, we can get . From the assumption that the cost function is convex
function,  we  can  know  that  4k1k2 –  s2 >  0.  Meanwhile,  as  s <  0,  it  is  obviously  that
,  . That is to say, the effort levels  e1 and  e2 are all greater
than  0.  The  sharing  coefficients  of  optimal  revenue  are  ,  ,
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,  get  ,   into  the fixed-price  function and simplify  the function.  The
result is the optimal fixed-price , .
The model solution shows, when the effort costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are
mutually substitutable, the multi-task incentive model of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing
completely  degrades  into  a  single-task  incentive  model  of  explicit  knowledge sharing.  The
reason for  this  is  that  the value which is  produced by sharing tacit  knowledge cannot be
verified and employers will not pay for it. Meanwhile, under the condition of cost substitution,
tacit knowledge sharing leads to cost increase of sharing explicit knowledge instead，so service
providers will also not try to share tacit knowledge. when the effort costs of explicit and tacit
knowledge  sharing  are  substitutable,  the  revenue  coefficient  of  tacit  knowledge  sharing
stimulation is still meaningless. Employers will still not pay for the value of tacit knowledge
sharing, but the model does not degrade into a single-task incentive model. Service providers
will share not only explicit knowledge, but also tacit knowledge. We can find that both positive
and negative s, namely the complementary and substitutional relation between the effort costs
of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing, can affect the contract parameters given by employers
and the ultimate profit of employers. Next, the paper will compare the influences of +s and –s
on the final results for further management significance.
4. Model Analysis
(1) Comparison of the sharing coefficient of optimal revenue 
. Note that  s < 0, so  . It means the sharing
incentive coefficient of optimal revenue in the case of complementary relation is greater
than the sharing coefficient of optimal revenue in case of substitutional relation.
(2) Comparison of the optimal effort levels of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing 
, . And then , , namely
, . It means that the effort levels of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing in
the  case  of  complementary  relation  are  all  greater  than  those  in  the  case  of
substitutional relation.
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(3) Comparison  of  the  expected  revenue  of  the  buyer  under  two  conditions
. so s < 0, And then R** – R* > 0,
namely  R** >  R*.  It  means  that  the  expected  revenue  of  the  buyer  in  case  of
complementary relation is greater than that in case of substitutional relation.
(4) Comparison of the optimal fixed-price of R&D outsourcing under two conditions 
, then F** – F* < 0, namely F** < F*. It means that the fixed-
price of R&D outsourcing in the case of complementary relation is less than that in the
case of substitutional relation. From the above comparisons, we can draw conclusion 1.
Conclusion 1:  When the costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are complementary,
, , , R** > R*, F** < F*.
Conclusion 1 shows when the costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are complementary,
the buyer can increase the incentive coefficient of explicit knowledge sharing ( ) to
stimulate  tacit  knowledge  sharing ( ).  This  motive  method not  only  stimulates  tacit
knowledge  sharing,  but  also  can  further  stimulate  the  effort  levels  of  explicit  knowledge
sharing ( ).
Through the analysis above, the parameters of the formal R&D outsourcing contracts and the
effort levels of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing in these contracts have been obtained.
Then,  is  the  design  of  these  R&D outsourcing  contracts  effective  in  stimulation?  For  this
purpose, the effort levels of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing under centralized decision are
given as benchmarks. Under centralized decision, the buyer and service providers are viewed
as a system to make optimal decisions, then the sum of the revenues of the buyer and service
providers is  ,  and the optimal  e1  and  e2 are decided to
maximize the total expected revenue. The resulted effort levels of explicit and tacit knowledge
sharing under centralized decision  and  are as follows, , .
When  s >  0,  ,  obviously  .  At  the  same time,
when  , it is obviously that  . When  s < 0,  ,
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. According to the assumptions above,
it is obviously that .
Conclusion 2: when s > 0, then , . When s < 0, then , .
Conclusion 2 shows, when s > 0, namely the effort costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing
can substitute each other, formal R&D outsourcing contracts cannot stimulate explicit and tacit
knowledge sharing to be optimal. When  s <  0, namely the effort costs of explicit and tacit
knowledge sharing are complementary, formal R&D outsourcing contract can only stimulate
explicit knowledge sharing to be optimal but fails to stimulate tacit knowledge sharing. That is
to say, formal R&D outsourcing contract has not realized optimal system and has room for
Pareto improvement. For tacit knowledge sharing especially, there is considerable room for
Pareto improvement.
5. Conclusions
R&D outsourcing has become one of the most effective ways for enterprises to acquire external
knowledge  rapidly.  The  existing  researches  focus  on  transferring  and  sharing  explicit
knowledge  whose  value  can  be  verified,  but  ignore  the  transmission and  sharing  of  tacit
knowledge whose value cannot be unverified .Thus leading to the lack of tacit  knowledge
sharing in R&D outsourcing. In order to stimulate tacit knowledge sharing as well as explicit
knowledge sharing, a multitask principal-agent model of simultaneous stimulation of explicit
and tacit knowledge is established and the incentive effects of formal and informal relational
contracts on knowledge sharing are analyzed. Researches show that when the relationship
between the costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are mutually substitutable, formal
contract can only stimulate the effort of sharing explicit knowledge but fails to stimulate the
effort  of  sharing  tacit  knowledge.  When the  two  are  complementary,  formal  contract  can
stimulate the efforts of sharing explicit and tacit knowledge at the same time. However, it can
only stimulate the effort of explicit knowledge sharing to the optimal level, not tacit knowledge
sharing. 
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